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This Work Project presents a valuation of Airbus SE, an 
aerospace and defence company. At the beginning of the report 
an overview of the company’s business segments is given. 
Followed by a presentation and discussion of the aerospace 
and defence sector including an analysis of the market demand, 
supply and trend as well as the industry’s and company’s 
growth potential. Finally, the valuation itself will be presented. 
On the basis of a DCF valuation Airbus SE’s share price for 
the target date 31.12.2020 is calculated. A forecast that results 
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§ In the Commercial Aircraft segment we see a high demand for 
Airbus aircraft especially coming from the narrowbody segment 
driven by a growing propensity to fly in the emerging markets as 
well as the ongoing rise of low cost carriers. We believe, this 
leads to a production rate increase as Airbus offers the most 
efficient aircraft in this segment. The production rate increase in 
the narrowbody segment comes with a margin improvement 
which is supported by the general shift to new engine option 
aircraft with higher margins. 
§ Airbus Defence & Space enjoys good long-term forecasts. The 
top-selling business line military aircraft is expected to grow as 
a result of a major European defence project. This growth is 
assumed to be actively supported by the Space Systems 
segment. 
§ In the future, Airbus Helicopters will have a broader base and 
thus has good growth opportunities. In addition to the traditional 
helicopter business, the company will also focus on its service 
offerings. The product range will be expanded to include 




Manufacturing and designing commercial aircraft, military 
transporters, helicopters, satellites and launch vehicles as well as 
other solutions, Airbus is one of the world leading suppliers in the 
aerospace and defence sector. In order to do this as efficiently as 
possible, Airbus has divided its business into three units, which are 
Commercial Aircraft (CA), Helicopters (H) as well as Defence and 
Space (DS).   
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(Values in € mn) 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 63,707 70,607 77,444 
Revenue Growth 11% 12% 12% 
Core EBITA 5,395 6,694 8,009 
Net Income 3,054 3,901 5,076 
EPS 3.94 4.99 6.47 
P/E 21.3 21.22 21.45 
    
    
    
    
    







In a duopoly with a weakened competitor, 
Airbus can only be beaten by itself 
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Airbus Commercial Aircraftial Aircraft  
Offering customers a full range of passenger aircraft, corporate jets, freighters as 
well as supportive services the commercial aircraft unit creates around 74% of the 
group’s revenues, which accounted for €47.2bn in 2018. 
Inside commercial aircraft the main value driver is the production and delivery of 
the different types of passenger aircraft for more than 100 passengers. Thus, 
Airbus offers narrowbody jets (single-aisle aircraft for 100-240 passengers) as well 
as widebody jets (twin-aisle aircraft for more than 200 passengers), for 100 to more 
than 500 passengers and distances of up to 18,000km. 
In addition to the sale of aircraft, the after-sales service at Airbus commercial 
aircraft plays an increasingly important role. Next to traditional maintenance & 
engineering, flight trainings and flight operations, Airbus also recently offers the 
Skywise program.  Skywise draws on operational data collected from thousands 
of Airbus aircraft and other aircraft in subscriber airline fleets. Airlines participating 
in this program can benefit from vast amounts of operational data and optimize 
aircraft performance through flight operations data analytics among other things.  
Airbus Defence & Space  
Airbus Defence & Space is the second biggest business segment of Airbus 
representing 17% of the group’s total revenue.1 It originated after the restructuring 
in 2014 from the former EADS divisions: Cassidian, Airbus Military and Astrium. The 
segment itself is again separated in three business lines: The Military Aircraft range 
includes mission, transport, tanker and combat aircraft. Space Systems offers a full 
range of civil and military services for telecommunications, navigation observation 
and orbital systems. The space industry can be further divided into three segments: 
Satellites, Launch Services, and Ground Equipment, all of which are served by 
Airbus. And the third segment Communication, Intelligence, and Security (CIS) 
comprises services around their business line: CyberSecurity, data processing from 
platforms and secure communication.  The main revenue driver for Defence & 
Space are the military aircraft activities with their most prominent product, the 
combat aircraft “Eurofighter Typhoon”. 
 
 
                                               
1 Airbus Annual Report 2018 
Revenue development Airbus Defence 
& Space in €bn 
Source: Airbus annual report 2014-2018  
Revenue distribution inside Airbus 
Defence & Space 2018 
Source: Airbus annual report 2018  
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Commercial Aircraft 2018 
Source: Airbus annual report 2018  
Revenue development Airbus 
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Airbus Helicopter  
Airbus Helicopter is the third and in the same time smallest segment of the Airbus 
Group. This business segment is the market leader in the civil 
& parapublic helicopter market grabbing a market share of 54% in 2018. In the 
same year Airbus Helicopters realized a revenue of €5.934bn which represents 9% 
of the group’s total revenue.  
Airbus Helicopter is split in a civil and military division, whereas the civil sector is 
with 51% only slightly larger.2 The product range consists of a total of 17 helicopters 
throughout the categories light, medium and heavy. The company also produces 
two specialised military rotorcraft and another helicopter is currently in the 
development stage. Its certification is due at the beginning of 2020. Orders for this 
rotorcraft have already been placed.   
Furthermore, Airbus Helicopter also focused on expanding its service and support 
networks such as HCare. We see this as an important step of diversification in 
times of declining orders and believe that this in the long run improves the 
relationship between customers and the company.3 
Shareholder structure 
The shareholder structure reflects the reason why Airbus was founded in the first 
place in May 1969. European industrial leaders as well as politicians initiated this 
project with the aim to compete with US manufacturers such as Boeing, McDonnell 
Douglas, and Lockheed Martin.  For this reason, the states Germany and France, 
who founded Airbus, are still shareholders of the company today.  Spain joined this 
European project in 1971. These three countries together have a blocking minority. 
This means that they can prevent a decision from being taken when a qualified 
majority is required. As Airbus has these three major shareholders, the company 
enjoys a certain level of stability and is protected from potential hostile takeovers. 
These shareholders have also a special way of backing the company financially. By 
the means of refundable advances called ‘European governments’ refundable 
advances’ the governments inject further money during the development phases of 
projects. The peculiarity in this case is that the shareholders do not only give money 
to Airbus in the form of equity but also loans that only have to be paid back if the 
projects are successful. We see this as an advantage over other market players as 
Airbus financial risk of new projects is limited. 
 
                                               
2 Airbus Helicopters Key Figures 2018 
3 Calderwood, D. (2019, November 4). A breath of fresh Airbus in the Middle East. Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://www.arabianaerospace.aero/a-breath-of-fresh-Airbus-in-the-middle-east.html. 
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Airbus Commercial Aircraft 
Target market 
Airbus Commercial Aircraft operates in the global commercial jet airplane market. 
This market is characterized by a very homogenous competitive environment with 
only a few competitors. The largest market players 2018 in terms of deliveries are 
Boeing (806), Airbus (800), Embraer (90) and Bombardier (33). However, the most 
relevant competitor of these is Boeing, as it competes directly with Airbus in the 
narrowbody and widebody segment, while Embraer and Bombardier operate 
primarily in the regional jet segment and therefore compete with Airbus at the lower 
end of the narrowbody segment at most. At the beginning of 2019 the narrowbody 
segment was the largest segment in the commercial jet aircraft sector with almost 
16,000 active aircraft. The wide body segment comprised about 5,500 active 
aircraft and the regional jet segment about 3,500 aircraft.4 
In the narrowbody and widebody segment, which comprise a total of more than 
21,000 aircraft, Airbus and Boeing enjoy a quasi-duopoly position, in which Boeing 
has been ahead in terms of sales in recent years. This was due to both higher 
overall deliveries and a larger share of more expensive widebody deliveries. While 
Airbus has already been able to report higher net orders for most of the past few 
years, these will probably also be reflected in higher revenue figures in 2019, as 
Airbus was able to deliver significantly more aircraft than Boeing in 2019, 
particularly as a result of the 737-Max crisis. 
Factors driving demand 
In order to be able to provide a valuation of the company it is important to 
understand which factors are influencing the demand of the offered aircraft and 
which consequences this will have for the aircraft manufacturers.  
The probably most important factors for global aircraft demand are air traffic 
demand, freight demand, the global economic development, oil prices, national 
and international (de-)regulations, the age of the existing fleet and the replacement 
demand as well as the availability of aircraft financing. Moreover, temporary events 
such as political crises, pandemics, environmental disasters, wars and terror 
attacks have negative impacts on demand and lead to fluctuations in the short-
term. This effect is even stronger when aircraft financing is limited. But in the long-
term aircraft demand is mainly still dependent on air traffic demand, which is 
                                               
4 Oliver Wyman (2019), Global Fleet& MRO Market Forecast Commentary 2019-2029 
Jet aircraft deliveries 
Source: Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, 
Bombardier, Cirium 
Global fleet 2019 
Source: Oliver Wyman  
Airbus and Boeing revenues in €bn 
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primarily influenced by long-term economic development. In fact, there is an almost 
perfect correlation between air traffic demand growth and the global GDP growth.5 
Besides, the global economic development, population growth – particularly of the 
financially strong middle class – as well as flight fares play a crucial role.   
In total, a booming global economy and rising wages would lead to a growing 
demand for additional aircraft. Contrary, a decrease in important economies would 
lead to a restructuring of airlines’ fleet planning so that they would match the global 
demand. Moreover, a significant increase in fuel costs, which are depended on oil 
prices, would result in airlines replacing old and inefficient aircraft faster than 
planned with new, more efficient aircraft in order to prevent a decrease in 
profitability.  
Indeed, there is a direct negative correlation between oil prices and the profitability 
of airlines.6 Airlines also benefit from low interest rates as these reduce financing 
cost of new aircraft. However, if interest rates rise, Airlines would preserve their 
existing fleet and delay new orders.  
Macroeconomic conditions 
Following the estimations of the OECD, one clearly sees that the global GDP is 
expected to grow with a CAGR of 2.8% until 2038, which would imply a factor of 
1.69. Main growth drivers are mostly Asian countries such as China with a CAGR 
of 3.4% or India with a CAGR of 5.6%.7 Moreover, global population is forecasted 
to grow with a CAGR of 0.86% reaching a total of 9.1bn people in 2038 according 
to the UN.8 Particularly, the  global middle class (income between $20k and $150k) 
is predicted to increase from 3.95bn in 2018 to 5.95bn people in 2038 making up 
66% of global population. The main growth here is coming from developing 
countries as well as Asia.9 The strong growth of the solvent and more travel-
friendly middle class will result in a strong increase in travel demand. Thus, the 
International Air Transport Association believes that global air traffic demand 
measured in RPK is expected to grow with a CAGR of 4.4% from 8.26x1012 
passenger kilometers in 2018 to 19.4x1012 in 2038, which would imply a factor of 
2.3.10 Besides, Canada's Energy Board for example expects Crude Oil prices to 
rise steadily in the next years, reaching $75 per barrel in 2027.11 The American 
EIA even forecasts oil prices of $100 per barrel in 2050.12 In combination with 
historically low interest rates, which won’t rise that much in the nearer future 
                                               
5 IATA (2019), Annual growth in global air traffic passenger demand from 2006 to 2019 & OECD (2019), Real GDP long-term forecast  
6 IATA (2019), Economic Performance of the Airline Industry - 2019 Mid-year report 
7 OECD (2019), Real GDP long-term forecast" 
8 United Nations (2019), World Population Prospects 2019 
9 Oxford Economics (2018), The geography of the global middle class 
10 IATA (2019), Global Air traffic growth forecast 2019 
11 Canada Energy Board (2019), Canadas Energy Future 2019 
12 EIA (2019), International Energy Outlook 2019 
Global middle class forecast in bn 
Source: Oxford economics  
World population forecast in bn 
Source: UN  
Correlation airline profitability and oil 
price 
Source: IATA  
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according to different economists, this will lead to an ongoing high demand for 
commercial aircraft during the period under consideration until 2038 in our view. 
This demand is driven both by a large number of replacements and the need for 
new aircraft due to increased air traffic demand. 
Assessment of market demand 
In order to be able to approximate the for Airbus relevant demand we have 
examined the narrow and widebody segment more closely. Based on the IATA 
forecast that air traffic demand will increase 2.3-fold by 2038 and the assumption 
that aircraft utilization can be further optimized in the future, we assume that at 
least a doubling of the current global fleet is necessary to meet the additional 
demand for air traffic. The global fleet of commercial jet aircraft would thus increase 
by 24,900 aircraft to a total of 49,800. In addition to this number, there are also the 
aircraft required for replacement. Aircraft retirements increased in average by 4% 
yearly since 1980.13 With 505 aircraft retired in 2018 this growth rate would lead to 
15,640 retirements until 2038. Considering increasing oil prices as well as the fact 
that 505 retirements in 2018 are a comparably low basis (between 2008-2013 there 
were around 700 retirements each year), we consider this number to be a 
conservative approximation of the replacement need. Thus, we assume that at a 
rough estimate there is a total demand for at least 40,50014 new commercial jet 
aircraft until 2038. All in all, we think this is a pretty good overall market demand 
for Airbus. 
In our view, this demand will be to a large extent driven by narrowbody aircraft. 
This trend already emerged during the last years and is likely to extend further. 
Technological progress leads to higher ranges and more efficient narrowbody 
aircraft. Thus, narrowbody aircraft with its lower capacities can also be used for 
long-haul flights to secondary airports, which before could have been only supplied 
unprofitably with widebody aircraft. Hence, narrowbody aircraft are for example a 
perfect instrument for the further aspiring low cost carriers. The growth of the 
widebody segment correspondingly will be lower, since many widebody aircraft will 
be substituted by narrowbody aircraft.  
Analysis of market supply 
In order to understand how Airbus can benefit from this demand, we have further 
examined the product offering of Airbus and the other manufacturers as well as 
compared this by different criteria. These criteria include both range and capacity, 
                                               
13 IATA (2018), Best Industry Practices for Aircraft Decomissioning 2018 
14 Airbus and Boeing forecast a market demand of 39,210 and 44,040 aircraft 
Aircraft demand forecast 
Source: Own calculation  
Profitability of airline industry 
Source: IATA 
Crude oil spot price forecast in $/bbl 
Source: Canada Energy Board  
 
 








to understand the more precise scope, as well as price and, in particular, efficiency 
given that airlines (the end customers) operate at the minimum profitability level.15  
In the narrowbody segment Airbus is producing more than 10 different types of 
aircraft. Based on the current backlog, in our view the A220-300, A320neo, 
A321neo and A321 XLR are the most important of these aircraft for the future. 
Even though Boeing's 737-Max is currently in a crisis, we assume that it will remain 
the biggest competitor in the long term and therefore continue to include it in the 
comparison. A full competitive landscape can be seen in Figure 3 in the Appendix. 
The A220 which was originally developed by Bombardier and got acquired by 
Airbus in 2018 mainly competes in terms of capacity with the Embraer E-Jet E2 at 
the lower bound and the Boeing 737-Max 7 at the upper bound. Due to its 
lightweight-construction and extreme fuel-efficient engines it can be operated 
much cheaper than the 737 with almost the same capacity and range. According 
to list prices which are obviously never paid, since operators give huge discounts, 
it is also much cheaper.16 Compared to the Embraer, it is characterized by its 
greater range and greater capacity with similar efficiency. In our view the A220 
makes a perfect fit for underserved regional and transcontinental routes. Thus, we 
assume that it can achieve further success besides the interest of different US 
airlines which have already ordered the aircraft.17 Airbus‘ workhorse, the A320neo, 
directly competes with the 737-Max 8 in terms of capacity and range. Besides a 
lower list price it also has lower operating costs due to its 4-6% higher fuel 
efficiency.18 Thus, it is particularly interesting for low cost carriers and can show 
around 4,000 orders during the last 9 years. Other potential competitors are 
COMAC’s C919 or Irkut’s MC-21, which have not been approved yet, hence, there 
is no available operating data yet. Due to the limited experience of the 
manufacturers and the more than six-year delay of the programs, we assume that 
the jets of Airbus and Boeing should be on a technically higher level and therefore 
more efficient. A comparable picture emerges with the A321neo. It increases also 
lower purchase costs and consumes up to 7% less fuel than the 737-Max 10, its 
direct competitor in terms of range and capacity. Furthermore, Airbus announced 
this year that there will be an additional version with an even higher range entering 
the market in 2023. The A321XLR covers a market between the normal narrow 
and widebody ranges and will be used for example by United or American Airlines 
on transatlantic flights to replace the ageing and less efficient 757. More than 450 
                                               
15 IATA (2019), Economic Performance of the Airline Industry - 2019 Mid-year report 
16 Xing, J. (2015, February 24). CS300 first flight Wednesday, direct challenge to 737-7 and A319neo. Retrieved from 
https://leehamnews.com/2015/02/25/cs300-first-flight-wednesday-direct-challenge-to-737-7-and-a319neo/. 
17 Capa. (2019, October 11). Delta Air Lines: A220 delivers on performance and customer experience. Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/delta-air-lines-a220-delivers-on-performance-and-customer-experience-494791. 
18 Airbus documents 
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orders from 22 different operators in the last 6 months confirm the existing market 
demand for this aircraft.19 Since Boeing currently experiences high financial stress 
due to the 737-Max crisis, we believe that the launch of its own new midsize 
airplane will be further delayed or even canceled. Thus, Airbus for the moment will 
have no competition in this market and even airlines such as Delta Airlines, which 
have more than 100 Boeing 757 and 767 might be forced to rely on Airbus as its 
supplier.  Hence, based on the actual product offering in the market we see good 
conditions for Airbus to further increase its market share in the narrowbody 
segment. This is based in particular on the technical qualities of Airbus aircraft and 
in our view is not further strengthened by the 737-Max crisis. Boeing has 
announced a production stop for the time being, but since Airbus itself is producing 
at the limit and is booked out for years, Airbus will not deliver significantly more 
aircraft at once per year and won’t be able to supply replacement aircraft directly.  
In the widebody segment, however, the situation is not as definite. Airbus‘ A330 
and A350 versions compete with the different versions of Boeing’s 777 and 787.20 
Since these aircraft are used differently depending on the airlines, direct 
comparisons are not always clear. Based on range and capacity, however, it 
makes sense to compare the A330neo versions with the 787-8 and particularly 
with the 787-9. In the moment, the 787 is known as the most efficient widebody 
aircraft in the market and thus has slightly lower operating costs than the also very 
efficient A330neo. However, due to much lower development costs Airbus is in the 
position to sell the A330neo comparatively cheaper than Boeing its 787.  Thus, the 
difference in efficiency can be amortized by lower capital costs.21 Considering the 
huge number of old A330 still in-service today as well as increasing fuel prices, we 
believe there is a lot of replacement need for this aircraft in the next years which 
might lead to an increasing demand of A330neo.22 In the segment for aircraft with 
around 350 passengers Airbus‘ A390-900 is competing with Boeing’s 787-10. 
Again, the 787-10 is the more efficient aircraft but much more expensive regarding 
the purchase.23 Taking a closer look at the range, rather the 777-X might be the 
future competitor of the A350. The 777 has the more efficient engines but is much 
heavier than the A350. Eventually, fuel consumptions per passenger might be on 
a comparable level depending on the case.24 Comparing pure list prices Airbus 
                                               
19 Airbus. (2019, December 20). Airbus' A321XLR flies high with 450 customer bookings. Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://www.Airbus.com/newsroom/stories/a321xlr-programme-update.html. 
20 The A380 and 747 are not included in the analysis as they are expiring products 
21 Vinay Bhaskara (25 November 2014). "UPDATED ANALYSIS: Delta Order for A350; A330neo Hinged on Pricing, Availability". Airways News. 
22 Airbus A330 market update and review. (n.d.). Retrieved December 31, 2019, from https://www.icf.com/insights/transportation/Airbus-a330-aircraft-
analysis. 
23 Cummins, N. (2019, October 1). The Boeing 787 vs The Airbus A350 - What Plane Is Best? Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://simpleflying.com/boeing-787-vs-the-Airbus-a350/. 
24 Cummins, N. (2019, August 17). Boeing 777x vs Airbus A350 - What Plane Is Best? Retrieved December 31, 2019, from https://simpleflying.com/777x-vs-
a350/. 
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versions are again much cheaper which could be the decisive sales argument. 
Moreover, Airbus just recently was able to win Qantas‘ sunrise project.25 We see 
this as a confirmation that Airbus is certainly competitive in the ultra-long-haul 
segment. However, we also see that especially in the widebody segment airlines 
are following their own very subjective strategies regarding fleet planning.  Thus, 
the decisive criterion is often not apparent in the end. However, it is also evident 
that Airbus is very competitive in the widebody segment, so we assume that the 
future market situation here will be quite balanced.  
This assumption is also supported by the analysis of the current backlog of both 
manufacturers. In the narrowbody segment Airbus has a backlog of more than 
6,600 aircraft while Boeing “only” has a backlog of 4,400 aircraft. In the widebody 
segment both manufacturers have an almost equal backlog of around 940 
aircraft.26 
Besides the product and backlog analysis we have also performed a customer 
analysis and have examined the top 100 airlines by fleet size more closely (Figure 
1.).27 The actual distribution of the current fleet among the different manufacturers 
is as follows: Boeing 44,1%, Airbus 41,4%, Embraer 6,1% Bombardier 4,4% and 
others 4,1%. Overall, 20 of the top 100 airlines have a fleet with a Boeing share of 
at least 85%, while 29 of the top 100 airlines have a fleet with an Airbus share of 
at least 85%. We see these airlines as a rather unattainable target market for the 
other manufacturers, since airlines would have considerably high switching costs. 
Nevertheless, Airbus has secured orders from Norwegian, Japan and All Nippon 
Airlines among others which otherwise operate almost exclusively Boeing aircraft. 
Especially the order of 35 A350 by Japan Airlines is noteworthy, since in our view 
this underlines Airbus competitiveness in the widebody segment once again. 
Moreover, Norwegian’s order of 88 A320 and A321 shows that airlines are willing 
to change their entire fleet planning because of the quality of Airbus‘ product 
offerings. Furthermore, Airbus has achieved a monopoly position with several big 
players (e.g. Indigo, AirAsia Group or Sichuan) in fast growing Asian markets such 
as India, China or Malaysia. Moreover, an analysis of the top 30 low cost carriers 
by fleet size also shows that Airbus aircraft are the preferred aircraft in this sector 
with market share of 51% while Boeing’s market share is just 42%. We see this as 
an important sign as the narrowbody segment is expected to grow due to a high 
demand of the LCCs.  
Threat of new competitors 
                                               
25 Qantas picks Airbus A350-1000 over Boeing 777X for Project Sunrise ultra long-haul flights. (n.d.). Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://www.businesstraveller.com/business-travel/2019/12/13/qantas-picks-Airbus-a350-1000-over-boeing-777x-for-project-sunrise-ultra-long-haul-flights/. 
26 Airbus and Boeing documents 
27 Planespotters.net (01. December 2019) 
Top 100 airlines fleet by manufacturer 
Source: Planespotters.net 
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Since demand appears to be secure under current market conditions, we have 
continued to examine the threat posed by potential new competitors. Particularly 
noteworthy here are the state-supported COMAC from China and Irkut from Russia. 
As already mentioned, both are currently developing a narrowbody aircraft which 
should provide an alternative for Airbus’ A320. Initially, the C919 from COMAC 
should be handed-over to the customers in 2016 but still has no certification of the 
authorities. The certification by the Chinese aviation authorities is now scheduled 
for 2021, so that the first delivery can be expected in 2022. The important 
certifications of European and US authorities are still open.28 A total of 815 orders 
or expressions of interest have been received so far, but only 34 of these come from 
abroad. Leading aviation experts to assume that the C919 due to its long delay has 
outdated technology and is not as efficient as comparable aircraft from Airbus or 
Boeing.29 Should this be the case, in our view even in the Chinese market success 
can’t be taken for granted, since airlines need to use the most efficient aircraft 
independent of the manufacturer due to margin pressure.  Without doubt the C919 
must prove its operational excellence first, before one can judge about its real threat 
to incumbent manufacturers. Moreover, long-term global success can just be 
achieved if COMAC is able to build a global support structure from scratch. 
Additionally, financing arrangements for airlines need to be provided and COMAC 
needs to resist against the price pressure from two in the past very aggressively 
acting competitors with enormous economies of scale through production levels of 
over 600 narrowbody jets per year. Bombardier recently failed because of this and 
thus Airbus was able to acquire its C-Series. Embraer on the other side has 
responded to these challenges by directly selling 80% of its commercial aircraft 
division to Boeing.30 However, at COMAC we see how determined the Chinese 
government is pushing this project and thus believe that COMAC will be able to 
pass this hurdle in the long-term. This is also supported by the fact that Airbus and 
Boeing currently are not able to fully supply the whole demand due to production 
constraints. Nevertheless, airlines prefer aircraft with a long-lasting track record and 
proven reliability. Thus, we assume that COMAC will only become a real global 
competitor in 10-15 years the earliest and reflect this correspondingly in our 
valuation.  
In general, a similar picture emerges in our view with the MC-21 from Irkut which 
initially was scheduled to enter the market between 2012-2015. Now market entry 
                                               
28 Zertifizierung erst 2021: Comac C919 droht weitere Verspätung. (2019, August 8). Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://www.aerotelegraph.com/comac-c919-droht-weitere-verspaetung. 
29 Harrison, V. (2019, April 28). Can China's plane-maker take on Boeing and Airbus? Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47689386. 
30 EU prüft Boeing-Embraer-Deal auf Wettbewerbsverzerrung. (n.d.). Retrieved December 31, 2019, from https://www.airliners.de/eu-boeing-embraer-deal-
wettbewerbsgruenden/52137.-  the acquisition has not yet been completed, as the EU competition commission is currently investigating it more closely due 












cannot be expected before 2021. Currently Irkut hast around 175 orders from 
Russia and other CIS states31 and plans to deliver just 1,000 aircraft during the next 
20 years. Moreover, geopolitical tensions and sanctions weaken the Russian 
economy. Thus, the Russian government can just support Irkut in a very limited way 
and airlines from various countries are not even allowed to buy Russian airplanes 
due to sanctions. Therefore, we expect Irkut not to be a global threat to Airbus. Also 
in Russia and the CIS countries Irkut first has to prove its potential. Besides, these 
state-supported projects we currently see no further threat of new competitors. The 
development of large passenger airplanes is very capital intensive as well as time 
and resource consuming, so that there are too high risk for not state-backed 
companies. 
Production capacities 
With best market conditions for Airbus and high demand for its product offering, it 
is also important to consider Airbus’ production capacity and possible limitations. 
Airbus has final assembly lines in Germany, France, USA, China and for the A220 
also in Canada and is thus globally represented. Nevertheless, Airbus must 
undertake enormous ramp-up efforts to meet global demand. In this regard, the 
A320neo has repeatedly caused problems. This has recently led to the fact that, 
the target level of 880 deliveries in 2019 could not be reached and only around 
86032 aircraft were delivered.  Following glitches with engine suppliers in 2018, it 
is now a new flexible cabin design in the A321 that makes production more 
complex and slows down the ramp-up.33 Overall, we therefore expect that Airbus 
will have to continue to increase its efforts to raise production levels, especially in 
the next one to two years. In our view, this will also be reflected in a significant 
increase in net working capital. Resources freed up by the discontinuation of A380 
production in 2021 could ease this situation. Further limitations can also result from 
a fully exhausted supply chain. However, as Boeing has announced a production 
stop of the 737-Max for the time being, some of the suppliers, such as the engine 
manufacturer CFM, whose engines are installed in both the Max and the A320neo, 
are likely to have capacity freed up again. We therefore see fewer risks for Airbus 
in this area in the near future. With regard to the ramp-up in the widebody segment 
and in particular for the A350, we do not currently see any problems for the 
foreseeable future. Airbus seems to be able to make smart use of the experience 
gained from the production of the A380. 
                                               
31 Irkut MC-21-300 receives 20 order commitments during MAKS 2019. (2019, August 30). Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://airlinerwatch.com/irkut-mc-21-300-receives-20-order-commitments-during-maks-2019/. 
32 725 confirmed deliveries until end of November plus 142 aircraft according to planespotters.net in December. Total year figures are not confirmed by 
Airbus yet. 












 Airbus Defence & Space 
Current situation  
This business line has been reducing its backlog due to the slowdown in demand 
for the last three years in a row. Moreover, the segment generated losses 
concerning an outstanding contract with Saudi Arabia due to the German Defence 
export ban. In order to avoid that these shortcomings have an impact on the long-
term prospective of Airbus Defence & Space, the segment’s CEO Dirk Hoke 
announced an efficiency plan with the aim to reach the Cash Flow target for 2019. 
Nonetheless, the long-term outlook is promising as the growth of military aircraft will 
be promoted by the recently signed European military project FCAS (discussion 
follows later) and the beginning replacement cycle of the Tornado-Jets.  
The space systems business segment struggled lately with a decreased demand 
for commercial satellites which as well contributed to imposing the efficiency plan. 
Launch vehicles, however, were able to gain foothold as Airbus could secure the 
first orders for Ariane 6 in 2018.  
Also, it can be seen that the order situation has improved by 22% in 2019 compared 
to last year’s result.34 These contracts, did not only come from the main revenue 
source in D&S but was supported by orders in space systems. 
Macroeconomic conditions  
The development in the defence industry is marked by the rearming of nations which 
is caused by two main drivers: a rising number of geopolitical tensions (Middle East, 
Russia and the United States) and the pressure on NATO members to spend 2% 
of their GDP on the defence budget.  
The global military spending has been increasing by 76% since 1998, the year with 
the least military investments in the post-cold war era and amounted to $1,822 
trillion in 2018. The industry is expected to continuously grow by 3% over the next 
years, resulting in a market value that exceeds $2 trillion.35 The nations with the 
highest defence spending are USA, China, Saudi Arabia, India and France who 
represent 60% of the total military investments on a global level.36  Furthermore, 
one must take into account that the Defence industry has changed and has grown 
by an important sector. Cyber warfare plays an essential role in the 21st century and 
Airbus introduced their CyberSecurity business line to meet this demand. This 
market is expected to grow from $167bn in 2019 to $248bn in 2023.37 
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35 2018 Global aerospace and Defence industry outlook (Deloitte) 
36 Tian, N., Fleurant, A., & Kuimova, A. (2019, April). Trends in the world military expenditure, 2018. SIPRI Fact Sheet. Retrieved from 
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Airbus’ Defence & Space revenues also benefit from a growing space industry. 
Since 2005 this market grew by 6.7% on average which represents almost twice 
the yearly global economic growth. This development can be explained as investors 
shifted from being governmental institutions to private organizations. Governments 
are often more reluctant and restrained in increasing their space budgets.38 
Regional trends and coverage 
Airbus Defence and Space’s core market consists of European nations. However, 
the company also tries to penetrate the Middle Eastern market to win new major 
clients like Saudi Arabia. Yet, the competition is tough as Donald Trump recently 
signed military contracts worth more than $100bn with Middle Eastern states.39 This 
development makes it more difficult for Airbus to gain foothold in this region. 
Therefore, the company’s focus has been on Europe where Airbus serves its largest 
customer base. Together with its French competitor Dassault Aviation, Airbus was 
commissioned a joint military project of Germany, France and Spain. The Future 
Combat Air System (FCAS) will be the successor of the Eurofighter. It is an 
integrated system that links drones, combat aircraft, satellites, command & control 
aircraft, surveillance and ground stations. On June 17th, 2019 the framework 
conditions for the project were signed by the three defence ministers. To date, it 
represents Europe's largest defence project that is valued at €50bn.   
Competitive environment & strategy 
The market leaders and main competitors of Airbus are Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
and Raytheon. 40 In general, there are two ways for defence companies to gain 
market share. Companies can either grow through being awarded contracts by 
their national governments or they seek new markets they can penetrate. The 
market leader Lockheed Martin, for example generated 79% of their revenues 
through defence contracts from the US government in 2017. Another way of 
growing chose Dassault, a European competitor of Airbus that won government 
contracts in developing countries. Airbus itself decided to change its strategy in the 
past years. In the past, the company focused on the European market to serve its 
customer base. After being awarded the FACS contract, it seems that Airbus wants 
to establish a second foothold outside of Europe. Therefore, the company tries to 
penetrate the Middle Eastern market lately.  
                                               
38The future of the European space sector. (2016). doi: 10.1787/9789264262065-18-en 
39 Artilleriesysteme: USA genehmigen Milliarden-Rüstungsdeal mit Saudi-Arabien - SPIEGEL ONLINE - Politik. (2018, April 6). Retrieved December 31, 
2019, from https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/usa-genehmigen-milliarden-ruestungsdeal-mit-saudi-arabien-a-1201529.html. 
40 Commercial Space Activities. (n.d.). Retrieved December 31, 2019, from https://spacepolicyonline.com/topics/commercial-space-activities/#us-aerospace-
companies. 












 Airbus Helicopter 
Current situation  
 Airbus Helicopters’ revenues declined by 6.3% over the last year. This can be 
explained by the fact that Airbus Helicopters sold one of their business 
segments Vector Aerospace in November 2017 and thus is missing its revenue of 
approximately €500mn. At the moment the main driver for a stable revenue at 
Airbus Helicopters is the services sector, which made up 41% of the business line’s 
revenue last year. This development correlates with the declining numbers of order 
intakes in Q3 2019. Also, less helicopters were delivered during the first three 
quarters in 2019 compared to the previous year. Airbus tries to compensate the 
weak platform revenues with an increased service offer. For this reason, the 
business segment realized stable revenues over the last year.  
Industry trends 
In the aerospace industry the helicopter market only represents a small fraction of 
the overall market. Over the past decades it gained on volume, but after the financial 
crisis in 2008 especially the share of civil helicopters decreased substantially. This 
prompted companies in this industry to introduce a new business line and source of 
income that helps to stabilize the revenue. Consequently, a services segment 
should now balance any losses that occur from a weaker demand in platforms. 
HCare, the services line of Airbus offers amongst others maintenance, flight training 
and technical support. This offer was well received by the client base as at the end 
of 2018 2,000 of Airbus’ helicopters were covered by this service. This trend is going 
to expand as clients are satisfied with this offer41 and the company strengthens a 
second stream of revenue.  
Airbus is also developing other types of helicopters that fall into the category "Urban 
Air Mobility". City Airbus, as it is called, is an electrically operated vertical take-off 
and landing (eVTOL) air vehicle which is intended to be used for point-to-point 
transportation like an “air-taxi”. According to original plans, it is supposed to fly fully 
autonomous, however, legal problems could limit these plans to a large extent. 
Besides the City Airbus, the company also develops a high-speed helicopter that is 
expected to reach a velocity of 400 km/h.  
These trends are going to support and broaden the traditional industry of helicopter 
production.  
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Regional coverage  & competitive environment 
 Airbus Helicopters intends to expand its business in the Middle East. This is to be 
achieved through its own location in Dubai, but also through cooperation with other 
local partners. This should increase demand through a recovery of the oil price and 
the wide product range and thus demonstrate Airbus' market power in this region of 
the world.   
In order to establish itself in the Middle East, Airbus relies on its former partner 
Saudi Arabia. According to the company’s CEO, 80 helicopters will be flying in Saudi 
Arabia next year. Airbus also sees great potential for further orders from the Saudi 
oil company ARAMCO, which ordered 5 H145 helicopters last year.  
Among the leading Defence contractors, companies from the USA continue to be 
the undisputed market leader. With sales of $398bn of the 100 biggest defence 
companies, they ranked number one ahead of European and Russian 
companies.42  
Although the helicopter industry is very competitive, Airbus manages to sustain its 
position as market leader in the civil rotorcraft industry which is led by European 
companies. This industry is marked by big global companies that often acquire 
smaller or regional competitors as did Lockheed Martin with Sikorsky or Leonardo 
with AgustaWestland. For this reason, the competition of large companies is drawn 
through different industries (Helicopter and D&S). However, it has to be noted that 
manufacturers such as Russian Helicopters, Turkish Aerospace Industries and 
Korea Aerospace Industries gained on growth and importance in this market.43 It 
will be difficult for these companies to directly compete with Airbus in the traditional 
segment of rotorcraft, solely if one considers the cost efficiency. Yet they can be a 
threat to Airbus’ business in the new fields as services and eVOTLs.  
Financial Analysis 
In order to draw conclusions for Airbus’ future development from the 
aforementioned and the financials of the three segments Airbus Commercial 
Aircraft, Airbus Defence & Space and Airbus Helicopters have been analysed in 
further detail and forecasts of the three business segments financials have been 
developed.  
 Airbus Commercial Aircraft 
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Starting with the Commercial Aircraft segment it becomes clear that the business 
is mainly based on the overall deliveries of commercial aircraft. Deliveries are 
directly dependent on demand on the one hand side and on the production rate of 
the different aircraft types on the other side. Thus, next to the already described 
air traffic demand growth Airbus is directely dependent on their capabilities to 
ramp-up aircraft production. Here, in our view a main value driver are the better 
margins of the more efficient neo versions with its new engines and longer ranges.  
An increasingly important key driver in this business segment are also the 
revenues generated by services. This driver is mainly influenced by the overall 
development of operated fleet of commercial aircrafts and the increasing amount 
of available operating aircraft data. Rising crude oil prices are forcing airlines to 
become more profitable and to optimize the use of their aircraft. The newly 
developed Skywise program is designed to profit from these developments. Since 
this software program is anything but material intensive and has a significantly 
better margin than aircraft production, every euro of revenue from Skywise will 
contribute to a future margin improvement. 
Forecast 
In order to determine how the key value drivers affect the valuation of Airbus, we 
use a forecast of 17 years until 2035 to achieve stable and unbiased  growth rates.  
As it has already been clarified before that in our view there is an enormous 
demand for aircraft in the next 20 years, the crucial question for aircraft deliveries 
is what production capacity and rate Airbus can provide during the next years. 
Since Airbus is at the end of a long supply chain, it is not only the capabilities of 
Airbus itself that are relevant, but also the sustainable resilience of its suppliers - 
especially engine manufacturers. With Boeing being in a crisis and even stopping 
the production of the 737-Max for an undefined time, we see released capacities 
for Airbus on the supplier side, which will support Airbus’ ramp-up efforts. Here, it 
can clearly be seen that immediate and future success will be particularly 
dependent on the A320 family. According to Airbus itself, the transition to the more 
profitable A320neo will lead to a 15% improvement in Adjusted EBIT in 201944 - 
the current results from 2019 Q3 support this. While production has already 
increased to 60 A320s per month, production is expected to rise to 2021 63 aircraft 
per month and 65 aircraft per month in 2022. From 2025 onwards, more than 70 
machines per month should be built.45 We expect these rates to be achieved with 
further investments in manufacturing and capacity freed up by the discontinuation 
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of A380 production. These rates are also covered by a very strong backlog of more 
than 6,000 aircraft from the A320 family. As the current production here is 70% 
A320 and 30% A321, but the backlog is 60% A320 to 40% A321, we also see room 
for margin improvement as the A321 is the higher margin aircraft.  Starting with the 
delivery of the A321XLR in 2023 we assume even higher margins. 
Looking at the new A220 series, of which more than 550 aircraft have been ordered 
to date, we can see a similar picture. Here as well a strong ramp-up is expected in 
the next years. Following Airbus, the monthly production rate should increase from 
4-5 aircraft per month nowadays to 14 aircraft per month – 4 in Alabama and 10 in 
Mirabel – in 2025.46 This increase is particularly important for Airbus, as cost 
savings of 10% can be expected from a production of 10 aircraft per month.47 At 
this point, however, we are much more conservative and expect a lower production 
rate of only 12 aircraft per month in 2025, mainly because the current backlog does 
not yet support such high production rates and we assume that a lot of Airbus 
capacity will be tied up by the more profitable A320 production - especially in the 
not too unlikely case that Boeing's 737-Max Grounding will last longer.48 Here, we 
assume that most of the deliveries will be A220-300 and just a small part A220-
100 in accordance with the current order book. 
The widebody jets A330 and A350, on the other hand, give a different picture. In 
this area, at least in the next 1-3 years, a ramp-up is no longer to be expected. The 
A330 production was just reduced to about 4.5 aircraft per month due to a slight 
cannibalization by the A350 and is currently being converted from the ceo to the 
more profitable neo version.49 Taking a closer look at the current order book and 
the order intake, higher production rates are not supported for the next 1-3 years. 
After a closer analysis of the active A330 fleet, however, it is noticeable that here 
many active aircraft are slowly reaching an age of 20+ years. In view of high 
conversion costs to other aircraft type and rising oil prices, we assume that a large 
proportion of these aircraft will be replaced by the new A330neo model and expect 
to see corresponding orders within the next few years.50 Thus, we expect slightly 
rising production rates starting in 2022. Here, we assume that most of the 
deliveries will be A330-900 and just a small part A330-800 in accordance with the 
current order book. 
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The A350, launched in 2015, is delivering solid results and is expected to break 
even this year. However, the ramp-up has been stopped at around 9.5 per month 
for the time being as demand has slowed somewhat. Overall, however, we expect 
demand to pick up again in the short to medium term, with many older widebody 
aircraft retiring from 2022 onwards. Thus, here as well we expect slightly rising 
production rates starting in 2022. We expect the ratio of A350-900 to A350-1000 
to remain about the same at 70% to 30%. 
As far as the super jumbo A380 is concerned, there are still 9 outstanding orders 
of which 7 are expected to be delivered in 2020 and 2 in 2021.51 Afterwards the 
production will be completely stopped due to a lack of demand. 
In order to move from the expected aircraft deliveries in units to revenue values, 
we have used Airbus latest list prices of January 2018 as a basis.52 As Airbus 
grants discounts of approx. 40-60% depending on the order size, we calculated 
the average discounts for the respective aircraft type  on basis of the 2018 
results.53 In addition, there is a price escalation formula designed to protect Airbus 
from inflation and other factors so that the price adjusts over time. Thus, the market 
values for each year are changing with the expected inflation.  
All in all, we  arrive at a total revenue from aircraft deliveries of € 73.3bn in 2025 
compared to € 44.2bn in 2018. After 2025, we expect the growth rate to further 
decline until 2035, when the expected long-term growth rate of 3.2% will be 
reached. At that time, sales from aircraft deliveries will have reached approximately 
€ 109.6bn, which equals a CAGR of 5.5%. The long-term growth rate is derived 
from the global long-term real GDP growth expected by the OECD (2.18%)54 and 
the long-term target euro inflation rate (2%).55 We expect this to be a realistic 
approximation of long-term growth in the commercial aircraft sector, as on average 
there is a perfect correlation between passenger growth and GDP growth.56 
Moreover, we have deducted a 1% discount from this nominal growth rate to 
account for expected losses of market share due to an expected new competitor. 
An even higher CAGR is forecasted for Services, the other key revenue driver of 
the commercial aircraft segment. The growth here is mainly influenced by the 
aforementioned growth in the total operated commercial aircraft fleet as well as the 
superior service which can be delivered due to the Skywise program. While Boeing 
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forecasts a 3.5%57 CAGR of the commercial aircraft services market until 2028, 
Airbus forecasts an even higher growth of commercial aircraft services from $76bn 
in 2018 to $160bn in 203758, which equals a CAGR of $4%. We predict that Airbus 
will even grow faster than the rest of the market mainly due to the Skywise program 
with a CAGR of almost 6% reaching € 6.1bn of revenues in 2025 and € 9.2bn in 
2035 compared to € 3bn in 2018. Compared to Airbus ambitions to achieve € 8.7bn 
of revenues in this area within the next 10 years, our forecast is therefore even 
conservative.  
However, most of the growth in revenues is offset by growth in costs. The main 
cost factor here is the cost of sales. Since aircraft production is highly dependent 
on the use of materials and working hours, the cost of sales increases almost 
proportionally to sales and will reach €89.2bn in 2035 compared to €37.1bn in 
2018. Nevertheless, this is a gross margin improvement of roughly 2.4% compared 
to 2018 reached due to more automatization, a higher power over suppliers, a 
more favourable product mix (shift towards more A321 and neo versions), learning 
curve effects (especially with A350 and A220) and economies of scale inside the 
different product lines. SG&A expenses on the other hand have a more fixed cost 
nature and are assumed to decrease in percentage of revenue with a rate of 
0,09%, which is the average decrease of the last 7 years. Thus, SG&A will reach 
€ 2.7bn in 2035 compared to €1.5bn in 2018. An almost comparable approach was 
used to determine R&D expenses, which also have a more fixed cost nature and 
will reach €5.7bn  in 2035 compared to €2.6bn in 2018. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that starting in 2025 R&D won’t further decrease in percentage of revenue, 
since the start of a development of a completely new aircraft type  is expected to 
occur at around that time, which should be on the market 2035 the latest.59 
Moreover, D&A is expected to remain a roughly constant as percentage of NPPE 
and thus will increase to €3.8bn compared to €1.8bn in 2018.  
Taking a closer look at the balance sheet, the most interesting part is the 
development of working capital. Here we expect in particular a further increase of 
the inventory. Until 2025, an inventory holding period of 311 days might be reached 
compared to 280 days in 2018. This increase is a continuation of the trend of recent 
years and reflects the strong ramp up efforts of the A320 family and A220. The 
collection and payables periods are estimated to rather stay constant, as 
compared to other manufacturers in the aerospace industry a relatively good level 
has already been achieved through high efforts in recent years. The last integral 
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part of working capital are customer prepayments. The customer pre-delivery 
payments have a very important function for Airbus, as they cover the industrial 
risk of aircraft manufacturers and usually ensure that the NWC of aircraft 
manufacturers such as Airbus is very low and are therefore cash flow driver 
number 1. For the future we assume that the current part of pre-delivery payments 
remains rather constant as a percentage of sales. If we look at the entire NWC, we 
see that it might increase slightly until 2025 due to increased ramp-up efforts and 
will decrease after 2025.  
After we have already mentioned the current part of customer prepayments, it is 
also important to consider the noncurrent part, which has been handled somewhat 
differently for the forecast. The difference between the two parts is that the current 
part is based on the volume of deliveries due within one year, while the non-current 
part is based more on the total volume of the backlog. Since we assume that the 
backlog in units will no longer grow much stronger, but only the total value will 
increase due to the escalation formula – in particular to compensate for inflation – 
the non-current part of pre-delivery payments will also grow only in line with the 
expected inflation rate.  
Other balance sheet items relevant for estimating investment cash flows like 
CAPEX and NPPE were assumed to remain constant relative to comprehensive 
revenues given the high capital requirements of operating in the aircraft 
manufacturing industry. 
All in all, we expect a growing ROIC and a decreasing investment rate mainly due 
to more service revenues and a shift towards higher margin products. In total, we 
expect the FCF of the Commercial Aircraft segment to increase from € 2.6bn in 
2019 to € 12.8bn in 2035 as we believe that Airbus will be successful delivering 
more aircraft at better margins.  
 Airbus Defence and Space 
The revenue of Airbus Defence and Space segment is forecasted to increase over 
the next years, a development which is based on three main pillars. Firstly, EU 
member states increase their investments in combined European military projects 
such as FCAS (Airbus was awarded the contract). Secondly, governments 
worldwide increase their space funding from which Airbus can also benefit. The 
industry has grown by 5.75% annually since 2013.60 Lastly, the threat of cyber 
warfare rises as countries increase their focus on digitalisation and 
interconnectedness. It is forecasted that this particular warfare will increase at a 
                                               
60 Seminari, S., & Seminari, S. (2019, November 20). Op-ed: Global government space budgets continues multiyear rebound. Retrieved December 31, 2019, 
from https://spacenews.com/op-ed-global-government-space-budgets-continues-multiyear-rebound/. 
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CAGR of 18% until 2024.61 For this reason, a growing need for Airbus’ Cyber 
Security products is expected. 
In the long-term prospects of Airbus Defence & Space the most part of the growth 
is expected to result from the FCAS project in the Defence sector. Furthermore, 
Space Systems’ positive development will depend on investments by mostly 
European investors in nano-satellites, launch vehicles such as Ariane 6, and the 
restart of the replacement cycle. Lastly, the sector CIS is set to benefit from the 
increased number in cyber-attacks, as cyber security is expected to remain one of 
the business line’s growth drivers besides their navigation programs.  
In the short-term the business segment needs to rely on their backlog as they 
experience a lack of new military contracts at the moment. The growth driver in the 
near future will predominantly stem from the CIS sector and from cost optimizations.  
Forecast 
Airbus Defence & Space is expected to grow at a CAGR of 3.46% until 2035. A 
substantial amount of growth is forecasted to come from the European military 
project FCAS that will mainly be realized in the second half of the forecasting period. 
From 2019 to 2021 the prototypes will be built, which are expected to be operational 
from 2026 onwards. Therefore, a CAGR of 3.49% in the military aircraft sector can 
be expected. The space segment is forecasted to show the largest growth rate of 
4.44% until 2035 attributable to new investments and replacements of older 
platforms. Lastly, the CIS sector is expected to show the slowest growth at a CAGR 
of 3.26% as strong growth is expected over the next two to three years due to the 
increased cyber warfare. However, from there the segment’s growth is forecasted 
to be stable once the high demand for Cyber Security is satisfied. 
Production costs are expected to decrease until 2026, which is attributable to more 
cost-effective production in the Space segment. From then on, these costs will rise 
again due to the FCAS project. The project will not only increase the production 
costs but also the R&D spending. It can be assumed that the most intensive phase 
will take place before production. For this reason, R&D expenditure is assumed to 
increase until 2026, after which it is forecasted to remain constant depending on 
the segment’s revenue.  
Inventories will increase in the near future as a conservative approach has been 
adopted due to sanctions against Saudi Arabia that are expected to remain in place 
and prohibit Airbus to sell their manufactured goods. As a result, the inventory of 
Airbus D&S will increase until 2023. After that, it will further increase at a slower 
rate caused by the FCAS project as certain delays in delivery at the beginning must 
                                               
61 Cyber Warfare Market Size, Share, Trends, Forecast (2019-2024). (n.d.). Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/cyber-warfare-market. 
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be assumed. This project is expected to require higher CAPEX investments, for this 
reason PPE is forecasted to increase gradually until 2026 when the production is 
expected to start. In total, we expect the Free Cash Flow from Airbus Defence & 
Space to increase to €1.125bn in 2035. 
 Airbus Helicopter 
The revenue growth of the helicopter market is dependent on socioeconomic 
reasons, the replacement cycle, innovations, and more recently, on increasingly 
important service offers. The compounded annual growth rate in this market is 
estimated to be 1.61% until 2020 and 2.08% in the following years.62  These 
developments are only sustained by strong social drivers and a robust economic 
environment. The civil and parapublic rotorcraft market is expected to increase by 
18,000 rotorcraft to a global helicopter fleet that is valued at $220bn. First of all, the 
increasing prosperity in the Asian-Pacific region will be the main growth driver in 
demand. Over the last years, Airbus has already benefited from a higher demand 
from China (its fleet grew by 2.7 times during the last five years).63 Secondly, the 
replacement cycle will lead to new orders especially form North America and 
Europe. Together these two markets represent more than 50% of the world’s 
helicopter fleet. This means that 57% of the newly produced helicopters will 
increase the already existing global rotorcraft fleet and 43% will serve as 
replacements especially in Europe and North America. Thirdly, the military 
helicopter market benefits from increased defence budgets and higher demands 
again from the Asian market. 40% of the total military rotorcraft orders in 2018 
originated from this region. 
Lastly, the services segment in the helicopter division makes up 41% and is 
forecasted to grow further in order to build a reliable and stable income pillar as the 
revenues of the sold platforms turned out to be very volatile over the last years.  
It must be mentioned we follow a conservative approach and doubt that that the 
development of the air taxis and unmanned rotorcraft will have a significant impact 
on Airbus' revenue over the next years and therefore did not account this innovation 
in our growth rate. 
Forecast 
The global demand for civil and military helicopters is expected to amount to 
18,000 units which represents a market value of $220.7bn until 2028.64 Of the 
newly produced rotorcraft, 43% will serve as replacements and 57% of the units 
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64 Huber, M. (2019, August 14). Ten-year Global Rotorcraft Market Pegged at $220B. Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
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will represent the actual market growth, indicating a considerable increase in the 
worldwide fleet of rotorcraft. We expect Airbus Helicopters to benefit from 
approximately 20% of the demand of 18,000 units which would represent 
combined revenues of roughly $40bn in the platform segment over the next ten 
years. For Airbus civil and parapublic platform this results in a CAGR of 3.08% until 
2028. However, it is assumed that the military platforms will not fully benefit from 
this demand as the competition is tougher, resulting in an annual growth rate of 
1.61%.   
Besides the global demand increase Airbus will introduce a new helicopter in the 
market which is expected to also drive growth. The first delivery is estimated to be 
in 2020. This helicopter with military equipment will be launched in 2026. This will 
push the revenues of the military platforms to a CAGR of 1.96% until 2035.  
In addition, Airbus is increasingly focusing on the services sector and its HCare 
programme. In 2035, it is forecasted to account for approximately 50% of the 
segment’s revenues. This development is intended to compensate for lower 
demand, especially in the military helicopter sector, in order to ensure steady 
growth in the business segment. In our view, it will be the main revenue growth 
driver until 2035 reaching a CAGR of 5.26% which leads to a total CAGR of Airbus 
Helicopters of 3.35%.  
Helicopter production costs are expected to fall by 0.15% until 2025 annually and 
then remain at a constant level. The lower costs can be explained by the perfected 
production of the Puma helicopters. The reason that costs will remain constant 
from 2025 is the introduction of the H160 military helicopter which will initially lead 
to higher production costs. Because of this rotorcraft it is expected that R&D costs 
will rise until the first expected delivery of the H160 military machine. Thereafter, 
these costs will then be assumed constant from 2026 onwards.  
The inventory holding period of this business segment is predicted to decrease 
steadily, as the services sector accounts for a larger part of the business and is 
less inventory intensive. Nevertheless, with the launch of a new helicopter we 
expect more production facilities to be needed. Thus, we see small CAPEX 
demand and a slightly increasing NPPE. In total, the free cash flow of this business 
segment is expected to grow to €758mn in 2035.  
Valuation 
 Discounted Cash Flows 
 In order to receive a valuation from our financial forecast, we performed a DCF 
valuation for each of the three parts and used its cost of capital as discount rate. 
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Cost of Capital 
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is calculated to assess the 
company’s cost of capital according to its financial structure and risk profile. In 
order to do so, comparable companies were chosen for each of Airbus’ business 
segments (Commercial Aircraft, Defence & Space, Helicopters). Their weekly 
historic data65 were regressed against the MSCI World Index in EUR which 
resulted in the levered betas for each company. This index was chosen as the 
majority of the governmental and institutional shareholders come from Europe.  
Thereafter, these figures were unlevered with their respective and company 
specific debt-to-equity ratios. In a next step, the average unlevered beta of Airbus 
and its competitors was calculated. This figure was then re-levered with Airbus’ 
financial structure to reach its business segment beta. This was computed without 
taking into account the peers’ financial structure. In course of the recent years, 
Airbus issued several bonds with a still long-lasting maturity, which led us to the 
assumption that the current D/E ratio66 is going to remain on a constant level. The 
calculation resulted in a beta of 1.25 for Commercial Aircraft, 0.97 for Defence & 
Space, and 1.16 for Helicopters (95% Confidence Interval [1.3686;1.0553]).  
With the different re-levered betas, we computed the levered cost of equity for each 
business segment, using the CAPM.67 To determine the market risk premium, the 
10Y German Government Bond was chosen as risk free rate which was 
consequently adjusted68 in line with the EU inflation69 as we decided to consider 
the market return of the MSCI World Index in EUR that we also used for the beta 
regression. Deducting the risk-free rate from the market return, a market risk 
premium of 9.3% was reached. In order to calculate the cost of debt (2.29%) the 
yield of the ten-year bonds of Airbus (2.44%) was used. This was subtracted by 
the product of the 10Y cumulative probability of default for A2 rated companies 
(annual probability of default: 0.32%)70 and the loss given default (recovery rate for 
senior unsecured notes: 53.85%)71.  
Consequently, we reached following WACC for three business units: Commercial 
Aircraft 10.35%, Defence & Space 8.19%, and Helicopters 9.65%. 
Results 
                                               
65 Observation Period: 08.02.2013 – 30.08.2019 
66 D/E ratio: 0.2078 
67 Re; 12.15% (Commercial Aircraft), 9.54% (Defence & Space), 11.30% (Helicopter) 
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Using these as discount rates for the respective free cash flows of the different 
business segments, we receive operating values of €101.3bn for Airbus 
Commercial Aircraft, €7.2bn for Airbus Helicopter and €12.8bn for Airbus Defence 
and Space. Adding nonoperating assets as well as net debt, this yields a common 
equity value of €115.336bn and with expected 784.3mn outstanding shares in 
2020 a share price of €147.01. 
Risks and scenario analysis 
As there are many different unpredictable factors, these valuation results are 
subject to much risk. For example, Airbus sells most of its products abroad, a large 
part of its turnover is generated in US dollars. Costs, on the other hand, are mainly 
incurred in Euros, as Airbus produces most of its aircraft in Europe. Airbus is 
therefore directly affected by exchange rate fluctuations. In order to minimize the 
resulting risks, Airbus hedged over 60% of its dollar revenues by securing fixed 
exchange rates for the next 2 years. For the time after that, the risk is again 
significantly higher.72 On the operational side, the main risk is that Airbus could 
very easily lose public trust in the event of a scandal or accident. How serious this 
could be can be seen very clearly from the current 737-Max crisis. 
Moreover, Airbus is very dependent on a few, very large and important suppliers 
such as engine manufacturers. If these are not able to deliver the required 
quantities or get into financial difficulties, this could lead to enormous production 
constraints at Airbus. The extent of this was evident in 2018 when Pratt & Whitney 
failed to keep up with the production of its turbines.73  
Additionally, there is also a dependency on individual large customers. If they lose 
faith in a product, order cancellations can lead to such large production gaps at 
Airbus that individual series can no longer be produced profitably and must be 
discontinued accordingly. This was recently the case with the A380.74 
Finally, Airbus is susceptible to sanctions that serve as political tools. A current 
example are the sanctions that European countries imposed against Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia banning military exports. These political decisions have an impact on 
Airbus’ revenues when it is not allowed to sell their goods to their clients.75   
In order to be able to quantify such effects on the share price, we have carried out 
a scenario analysis. This is focused exclusively on the commercial aircraft unit, as 
it represents over 80% of the value of Airbus. We have chosen the long-term 
growth rate and the WACC as modified parameters, as we consider these to be 
                                               
72 Airbus documents 
73 Retrieved December 31, 2019, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-19/pratt-whitney-close-to-fix-for-part-that-delayed-Airbus-jets. 
74 Maceda, C. (2019, February 14). UAE's Emirates cuts A380 order, signs deal with Airbus to buy 70 other aircraft. Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://gulfnews.com/business/aviation/uaes-emirates-cuts-a380-order-signs-deal-with-Airbus-to-buy-70-other-aircraft-1.1550121548306. 
75 Al Jazeera. (2019, October 17). Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Europe's 'double standard' in arms sales. Retrieved December 31, 2019, from 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/turkey-saudi-arabia-europe-double-standard-arms-sales-191016231548811.html. 
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indicators that can be used to reflect various risk assumptions. As it can be seen 
below, deviations of the terminal growth rate only lead to small jumps in the share 
price, while only small deviations of the WACC lead to very large jumps of the 
share price.  
 
Further, as deliveries of the A320 family are the main value driver within 
commercial aircraft and its ramp-up has shown some severe issues in the past, we 
have also examined the impact of ramping-up only half as fast as expected. This 
would lead to a DCF valuation of €139 per share and thus would have a strong 
impact.  
Multiples 
In order to analyse the Airbus group from a different angle, a multiple valuation of 
the company was carried out. The peers used for comparison consist of the main 
companies in the aerospace & defence industry, each with a market capitalization 
of at least €20bn. These companies compete directly with Airbus in various areas 
and have comparable characteristics.   
On the football field one can see the equity value of €124.3bn, which is composed 
of the average result of the different multiples and the DCF valuation. 
Consequently, with 784.34mn shares in circulation, a target share price of €158.42 
for December 2020 can be calculated on the basis of the various valuations. 
Compared to a stock price of €130.48 as of Dec 31st, 2019, this is a gain of €30.63 
per share. 
Considering expected dividends of €1.776bn during the year 2020, additional 
€2.27 per share are expected to be directly paid out to the shareholders. Thus, 
buying an Airbus stock today we see an 
expected return on investment of 23.2% in 
December 2020 and thus recommend 
buying the stock. 
2.68% 2.78% 2.88% 2.98% 3.08% 3.18% 3.28% 3.38% 3.48% 3.58% 3.68%
7.85% 212.48 214.63 216.88 219.21 221.64 224.18 226.83 229.59 232.49 235.52 238.69
8.35% 193.66 195.34 197.08 198.89 200.76 202.70 204.72 206.83 209.01 211.29 213.67
8.85% 177.95 179.28 180.65 182.07 183.53 185.05 186.62 188.25 189.95 191.70 193.52
9.35% 164.63 165.70 166.79 167.92 169.09 170.30 171.54 172.83 174.16 175.53 176.95
9.85% 153.21 154.08 154.96 155.88 156.82 157.79 158.78 159.81 160.87 161.97 163.10
10.35% 143.32 144.02 144.75 145.50 146.26 147.05 147.86 148.69 149.55 150.43 151.34
10.85% 134.66 135.25 135.85 136.46 137.09 137.74 138.40 139.08 139.78 140.50 141.24
11.35% 127.04 127.52 128.02 128.53 129.05 129.59 130.14 130.70 131.28 131.87 132.47
11.85% 120.27 120.67 121.09 121.52 121.95 122.40 122.86 123.33 123.81 124.30 124.80
12.35% 114.22 114.56 114.92 115.28 115.64 116.02 116.40 116.79 117.19 117.61 118.02
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Airbus Income Statement Core Business
2018 2019F 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2030E 2035E
Sales 63,707 70,312 77,444 81,485 86,821 91,454 96,708 101,719 127,503 150,753
Cost of Sales -50,644 -55,544 -60,855 -63,751 -67,650 -71,010 -74,857 -78,532 -97,835 -115,508
Gross Profit 13,063 14,768 16,589 17,734 19,171 20,444 21,851 23,187 29,667 35,246
SG&A expenses -2,007 -2,254 -2,410 -2,460 -2,539 -2,589 -2,647 -2,689 -2,893 -3,420
D&A expenses -2,444 -2,469 -2,536 -2,631 -2,734 -2,852 -2,979 -3,116 -3,919 -4,813
R&D expenses -3,217 -3,391 -3,632 -3,714 -3,842 -3,923 -4,016 -4,083 -4,808 -5,679
EBITA 5,395 6,654 8,011 8,930 10,056 11,080 12,209 13,298 18,047 21,333
Amortization and impairment of goodwill 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBT (Core operating income from sales before taxes) 5,395 6,654 8,011 8,930 10,056 11,080 12,209 13,298 18,047 21,333
Income tax payable -1,552 -1,878 -2,218 -2,424 -2,676 -2,889 -3,118 -3,324 -4,512 -5,333
Core operating income from sales after taxes 3,844 4,776 5,793 6,506 7,380 8,191 9,091 9,973 13,535 15,999
Airbus Commercial Aircraft 3,034 3,836 4,762 5,395 6,183 6,909 7,721 8,517 11,695 13,950
Airbus Helicopter 271 341 379 409 441 473 505 539 675 770
Airbus Defence and Space 539 599 652 701 757 809 864 918 1,166 1,279
Operating tax rate 28.8% 28.2% 27.7% 27.1% 26.6% 26.1% 25.5% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
Airbus Core Invested Capital
2018 2019F 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2030E 2035E
Operating Working Capital -2,795 -1,424 -976 -270 128 293 351 275 -244 -385
thereof Inventories 31,891 36,543 41,518 44,424 47,926 50,739 53,903 56,798 71,282 84,904
thereof Trade Receivables 6,078 6,708 7,389 7,774 8,283 8,725 9,226 9,705 12,164 14,383
thereof Trade Liabilities -16,237 -17,816 -19,530 -20,461 -21,716 -22,798 -24,037 -25,221 -31,420 -37,101
thereof Customer Pre-payments -26,229 -30,320 -33,663 -35,337 -37,723 -39,754 -42,150 -44,442 -55,825 -66,237
thereof Other 1,702 3,461 3,310 3,329 3,357 3,381 3,409 3,436 3,554 3,667
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment 20,460 21,009 21,791 22,645 23,617 24,663 25,799 27,004 33,883 41,310
Other Assets Net of Other Liabilities -15,379 -15,476 -15,612 -15,802 -15,974 -16,161 -16,343 -16,532 -17,528 -18,672
Less: Ongoing Operating Provisions -2,302 -2,490 -2,675 -2,801 -2,954 -3,091 -3,240 -3,383 -4,202 -4,915
Value of Operating Leases 1,985 2,249 2,513 2,777 3,041 3,306 3,570 3,834 5,154 6,475
Goodwill & Intangibles 13,039 13,025 13,025 13,025 13,025 13,025 13,025 13,025 13,025 13,025
Cumulative Written Off & Amortized 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
Op. Invested Capital 16,048 17,933 19,106 20,615 21,924 23,074 24,201 25,263 31,128 37,877
Airbus Commercial Aircraft 13,299 14,555 15,705 17,158 18,442 19,575 20,619 21,578 26,953 32,915
Airbus Helicopter 135 319 273 244 217 198 181 169 144 192
Airbus Defence and Space 2,613 3,059 3,129 3,213 3,264 3,301 3,402 3,516 4,031 4,769
Airbus Core Free Cash Flow 
2018 2019F 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2030E 2035E
EBITA 5,395 6,654 8,011 8,930 10,056 11,080 12,209 13,298 18,047 21,333
Adj. for Operating Leases 26 29 33 36 40 43 46 50 67 84
Adjusted EBITA 5,421 6,683 8,043 8,966 10,095 11,123 12,255 13,348 18,114 21,417
Taxes -1,559 -1,886 -2,227 -2,434 -2,686 -2,900 -3,130 -3,337 -4,529 -5,354
NOPLAT 3,862 4,797 5,817 6,532 7,409 8,222 9,126 10,011 13,586 16,063
Depreciation 2,444 2,469 2,536 2,631 2,734 2,852 2,979 3,116 3,919 4,813
Operational Cash Flow 6,306 7,266 8,352 9,163 10,143 11,075 12,104 13,127 17,505 20,876
Increase in Working Capital 793 -1,371 -448 -706 -398 -166 -58 76 85 -11
Capital Expenditures -2,285 -3,018 -3,318 -3,485 -3,707 -3,898 -4,115 -4,321 -5,373 -6,301
Increase in other operating assets / liabilities -1,519 97 137 189 172 187 181 189 211 240
Increase in ongoing operating provisions -63 188 184 127 153 138 149 142 156 138
Inv. in operating leases -395 -264 -264 -264 -264 -264 -264 -264 -264 -264
Investment in goodwill -3,898 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Investment Cash Flow -7,367 -4,354 -3,709 -4,139 -4,043 -4,002 -4,106 -4,177 -5,185 -6,199
Core Free Cash Flow -1,061 2,912 4,643 5,024 6,100 7,072 7,998 8,950 12,320 14,677
Airbus Commercial Aircraft -2,448 2,601 3,636 3,969 4,928 5,808 6,712 7,595 10,606 12,795
Airbus Helicopter 462 158 425 438 467 492 522 551 675 758
Airbus Defence and Space 926 153 582 617 705 772 764 803 1,039 1,125
Figure 1: Forecast of financial statements. Source: Own assumptions and calculation 
 
 











Top 100 aircraft operators by fleet size as of 01.12.2019
Aircraft Operator Airbus Boeing Embraer Bombardier Other Fleet Size Aircraft Operator Airbus Boeing Embraer Bombardier Other Fleet Size
Aegean Airlines 49 0 0 0 0 49 International Airlines Group 458 123 0 0 12 593
Aeroflot Group 166 131 0 0 59 356 Japan Airlines 4 169 0 0 0 173
Aerolineas Argentinas 12 44 0 0 0 56 JejuAir 0 46 0 0 0 46
Aeromexico 0 73 0 0 0 73 Jet2.com 1 91 0 0 0 92
Air Algérie 8 32 0 0 15 55 JetBlue 198 0 60 0 0 258
Air Asia Group 277 0 0 0 0 277 Juneyao 66 6 0 0 0 72
Air Canada 78 91 14 0 0 183 Korean Air 49 121 0 0 5 175
Air China Group 354 467 0 0 0 821 LATAM 253 77 0 0 0 330
Air Europa 11 33 11 0 7 62 Lion Air Group 54 188 0 0 80 322
Air France-KLM 159 269 92 25 3 548 LOT Polish Airlines 0 31 35 0 12 78
Air India 78 49 0 0 0 127 Lufthansa Group 576 68 43 35 41 763
Air New Zealand 35 30 0 0 23 88 Malaysia Aviation Group 36 48 0 0 23 107
Air Wisconsin 0 0 0 64 0 64 Mesa 0 0 60 85 0 145
AirArabia 55 0 0 0 0 55 Norwegian 0 156 0 0 0 156
Alaska Airlines 73 166 62 0 33 334 Oman Air 11 38 4 0 5 58
Alitalia 83 12 20 0 0 115 Pegasus Airlines 45 37 0 0 0 82
All Nippon Airways 28 209 0 0 0 237 Philippine Airlines 62 10 0 0 0 72
Allegiant Air 95 0 0 0 0 95 Piedmont 0 0 60 0 0 60
American Airlines Group 434 488 88 0 0 1,010 PSA Airlines 0 0 0 150 0 150
Asiana Airlines 57 29 0 0 0 86 Qantas Group 157 108 0 0 0 265
Avianca Holdings 126 14 0 0 15 155 Qatar Airways 123 110 0 0 0 233
Azul Linhas Aereas 45 2 59 0 33 139 Republic Airlines 0 0 198 0 0 198
Cathay Pacific 65 88 0 0 0 153 Royal Air Maroc 0 52 4 0 6 62
Cebu Pacific 54 0 0 0 20 74 Ryanair Holdings Group 23 450 0 0 0 473
China Airlines 37 51 0 0 0 88 S7 Group 60 23 17 0 0 100
China Eastern Airlines Group 386 337 3 0 0 726 SAS Group 71 53 0 25 9 158
China Southern Air Holding 371 462 21 0 0 854 Saudi Arabian Airlines 101 74 0 0 0 175
Compass Airlines 0 0 49 0 0 49 Sichuan 160 0 0 0 0 160
Copa Airlines 0 81 12 0 0 93 Singapore Airlines Group 113 105 0 0 0 218
Delta Air Lines Group 301 530 0 109 79 1,019 SkyWest 0 0 271 371 0 642
DHL 27 51 0 0 5 83 SmartWings Group 7 39 0 0 5 51
easyJet Group 332 0 0 0 0 332 South African Airways 48 2 0 0 0 50
EgyptAir 21 41 5 0 0 67 Southwest Airlines 0 748 0 0 0 748
Emirates Airline 114 155 0 0 0 269 SpiceJet 0 81 0 0 32 113
Ethiopian Airlines 13 80 0 0 27 120 Spirit Airlines 143 0 0 0 0 143
Etihad Airways 51 62 0 0 0 113 Spring Airlines 91 0 0 0 0 91
EVA Airways 34 47 0 0 2 83 TAP Air Portugal 86 0 13 0 8 107
FedEx Express 71 252 0 0 132 455 Thai Airways International 33 49 0 0 0 82
Finnair 59 0 12 0 0 71 TUI Group 5 140 4 0 0 149
flybe 0 0 12 0 61 73 Turkish Airlines 169 136 0 0 0 305
flydubai 0 55 0 0 0 55 United Airlines 179 611 0 0 0 790
Frontier Airlines 96 0 0 0 0 96 UPS 52 172 0 0 37 261
Garuda Indonesia 79 89 0 18 19 205 Ural Airlines 46 0 0 0 0 46
GoAir 55 0 0 0 0 55 UTair Aviation 0 49 0 0 15 64
GoJet 0 0 0 50 0 50 VietjetAir Group 79 0 0 0 0 79
Gol Transportes Aereos 0 135 0 0 0 135 Vietnam Airlines 85 14 0 0 1 100
Hainan Airlines Group 286 314 70 0 3 673 Virgin Australia Holdings 6 84 0 0 8 98
Hawaiian Airlines 40 20 0 0 0 60 Volaris 78 0 0 0 0 78
IndiGo 225 0 0 0 23 248 WestJet 0 124 0 0 0 124
Interjet 65 0 0 0 22 87 Wizz Air 120 0 0 0 0 120
Total 5,005 4,989 530 266 581 11,371 Total 3,848 4,433 769 666 299 10,015
Figure 2: Top 100 aircraft operators by fleet size. Source: planespotters.net 
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In this research paper the WTO dispute between Airbus and 
Boeing will be discussed and the impact on Airbus by the 
WTO’s decision will be analysed. First, a brief overview about 
the background and development of the dispute at the WTO 
between Airbus and Boeing will be presented. In the following 
the trigger of this conflict – the subsidies – will be discussed. 
Consequently, this paper examines whether Airbus is the party 
most harmed by the tariffs that the United States imposed 
against imported goods from the European Union. In order to 
do so the share prices, order numbers, and future strategy of 
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1. History of Dispute & Background 
The dispute between Airbus and Boeing has a long history, one could say that it has existed ever 
since Airbus was founded. Boeing had been the only big aircraft manufacturer for decades. To 
counter this market power European countries joined forces and founded Airbus. 1  
The first dispute arose when Airbus built a single-aisle jet (A320) that directly competed with 
Boeing’s 737. Although it was not the first time Airbus relied on state financing, it was the first 
time that the United States considered it problematic and trade distorting. In order to end the 
disputes over illegal subsidies, the EU and the US concluded the Large Civil Aircraft Agreement 
in 1992. 2 It regulated the level of financial support that companies were allowed to receive from 
governments. Direct subsidies to companies were limited to 33% of production costs and to an 
overall maximum of 4% of the companies’ yearly turnover in commercial aviation. A precise 
limitation of indirect subsidies was never given.3 This agreement worked well for the two 
companies until 2004. During this period Airbus launched its new project the A380, a wide body 
aircraft that could have serious impacts on the demand of Boeing’s 787 and the company’s market 
leader position in the LCA sector.4 Thus, it can be assumed that an impending loss in market share 
was attributable to the US decision (urged by Boeing) to file a complaint with the WTO. By filing 
a complaint with the WTO for illegal subsidies in the aircraft industry, Boeing automatically 
terminated the LCA agreement of 1992.5 The EU (backed by Airbus) retaliated and filed a 
complaint about prohibited subsidies against the United States.6  The dispute settlements continued 
                                                        
1 Çalişkan, Ö. (2010). An Analysis of the Airbus-Boeing Dispute From the Perspective of the WTO Process. Ege Akademik Bakis (Ege Academic 
Review), 10(4), 1129–1129. doi: 10.21121/eab.2010419599 
2 The airbus-boeing dispute: Implications of the WTO boeing decision. (2010). Intereconomics, 45(5), 262–263. doi: 10.1007/s10272-010-0345-4 
3 Wittig, S. (2011). The WTO Panel Report on Boeing subsidies: a critical assessment. Intereconomics, 46(3), 148–153. doi: 10.1007/s10272-
011-0376-5 
4 The airbus-boeing dispute: Implications of the WTO boeing decision. (2010). Intereconomics, 45(5), 262–263. doi: 10.1007/s10272-010-0345-4 
5 Wittig, S. (2012). Luftfahrtindustrie: Implikationen der WTO-Berufungsentscheidungen für Airbus und Boeing. Ifo Schnelldienst, 65(7), 21–27. 
6 Robertson, H. (2018). No Sign of Landing: Airbus, Boeing, the WTO, and the Expanding Large Civil Aircraft Battle. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3114942 
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for years until decisions were made in May 20187 respectively in March 2019.8(Appendix 1) The 
WTO sustained both complaints about illegal subsidies. On October 2nd, 2019, the WTO 
announced that the US were authorized biggest-ever granted tariffs on European exports valuing 
$7.5 billion (yearly). As the case against the United States was filed at a later point, the EU is still 
waiting for the level of authorized tariffs on US goods.9 
2. How was Airbus subsidized? 
It has to be distinguished between direct and indirect subsidies. Direct research funding includes 
the “Framework Programmes for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration” 
(FRP) that are offered by the European Union. These programs are created to help companies at a 
pre-competitive stage. Airbus has been benefiting from these since 1998 (it can be assumed that 
the acquisition of McDonnell-Douglas by Boeing was the trigger). The funding was provided by 
Airbus’ consortium states (Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom) and by the European 
Investment Bank.10  
The indirect subsidies consist of launch aid and infrastructure measures. The launch aid that Airbus 
receives is called ‘European Governments’ refundable advances’. It is a type of loan that has to be 
paid back with every plane the company sold, however, it only has to be paid back if a project was 
successful.11 The infrastructure measures include for instance the support from municipalities. The 
city of Hamburg reclaimed land from Airbus and financed a factory expansion on this property 
which was then leased back to Airbus at a low rate.12 Especially the indirect subsidies have become 
                                                        
7 dispute settlement - DS316: European Communities - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft. (n.d.). Retrieved November 22, 2019, 
from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm. 
8 dispute settlement - DS353: United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft   Second Complaint. (n.d.). Retrieved November 
22, 2019, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds353_e.htm.  
9 Garten, J. E. (2005). The Big Blowout: Why the Airbus-Boeing case could wreck the WTO, and how to stop it. Newsweek International. 
10 Maennig, W., & Wittig, S. (2010). WTO dispute settlement proceedings: European support for airbus in the spotlight. Intereconomics, 45(3), 
180–187. doi: 10.1007/s10272-010-0334-7 
11 Annual Report Airbus 2018 
12 Maennig, W., & Wittig, S. (2010). WTO dispute settlement proceedings: European support for airbus in the spotlight. Intereconomics, 45(3), 
180–187. doi: 10.1007/s10272-010-0334-7 
 
 5 
a point of contention between Airbus and Boeing as they are non-transparent and not easy to track. 
The indirect financing was primarily listed in the complaint filed by the United States with the 
WTO. 13 
3. To what extent is Airbus hurt by the tariffs? 
When the WTO announced the authorisation of tariffs against European exports to the United 
States, it did not specify the products or their amount. This compensation for illegal state aid took 
effect on October 18th and concerned first of all the export of fully assembled aircraft, but with a 
moderate import duty of 10%. Yet, these tariffs can be raised up to 100% at any time.  
Airbus serves the American market partly by a production facility in Mobile, Alabama. This will 
allow the company to avoid some of the penalty duties as they only concern fully assembled 
aircraft. The A320 and A220 aircraft are manufactured in this plant.14 However, with an output 
rate of 4-5 aircraft per month this corresponds to a maximum of 60 produced A320s. Currently, 
there are 670 orders from US airlines for the A320 aircraft. The fact that the demand cannot be 
fully satisfied by the production plant in Mobile leads to another party affected by the punitive 
tariffs: the US airlines. Due to the high order numbers fully assembled aircraft must be imported 
to meet delivery dates.15 Airbus is covering parts of  the tariffs at the moment, but it will pass on 
the higher costs to their customers by mid 2020.16 Considering the average price for the A321 
amounts to $130 million, 10% of the total orders right now (399 units) would result in $5.7 billion 
of extra costs for the Airlines.17 Initially, the tariffs appeared to be detrimental for Airbus. Yet, 
they have not hit the company hard as far as one can tell now. Neither the market nor the customers 
                                                        
13 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm 
14 Flottau, J. (2019, January 22). Trotzreaktion. Retrieved November 22, 2019, from https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/airbus-trotzreaktion-
1.4295178. 
15 US-Produktion von Airbus zunächst von Strafzöllen ausgenommen. (n.d.). Retrieved November 22, 2019, from https://www.airliners.de/wto-
us-strafzoelle-airbus-flugzeuge-produktion-mobile/52262. 
16 Kaminski-Morrow, D. (2019, October 30). Airbus starts to feel deliveries impact from WTO dispute. Retrieved November 22, 2019, from 
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/airbus-starts-to-feel-deliveries-impact-from-wto-dis-461885/. 
17 Airbus Total Orders and Deliveries: October 2019 
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were scarred off when the WTO sustained the US complaint about illegal subsidies in May 2018. 
(Appendix 2) Also, on October 2nd, 2019 the day of the announcement of the export volume that 
will be hit by punitive tariffs the Airbus share closed at  -2.04%, but closed at +4.86% the following 
day. Since then, the share price has risen steadily.18 (Appendix 3) Also, Airbus’ customers have 
not been scarred off. The order numbers in North America remained constant compared to the 
previous year.19 In the first nine months of 2019, 53 A321 neo and 23 A320 neo were ordered.20 
This shows that clients continued to order Airbus aircraft after May 2018 already knowing the US 
were allowed to impose tariffs on European goods at a later point in time. (Table 1) 
4. Conclusion 
The consequences for Airbus by the US tariffs are moderate so far. However, the threat that these 
duties can be raised to a 100% at any time presents a great insecurity, as the company’s long-term 
strategy for the North American market could have to change from one day to another.  
Also, once the US extends the tariffs including aircraft parts Airbus will not benefit from its 
manufacturing plant anymore. The company will start to struggle, as Airlines might overthink their 
order strategy to avoid those high extra costs. Yet, it is unlikely these will increase in the near 
future, as tariffs are as well going to be imposed on US goods. The industry is too important for 
both sides, therefore it can be expected that tariffs are going to be imposed on a “live and let live” 
basis. At the moment, it can be stated that Airbus is not hit as hard by the tariffs as previously 
expected, the company’s share price is rising and the order figures in the US market are increasing, 
only the tariffs that Airbus shares with its US clients at the moment present a negative impact.   
 
                                                        
18 Thomson Reuters Eikon 
19 Due to a lack of data, only the results of October 2019 can be compared to those of December 2018. 
20 Airbus Orders and Deliveries: December 2018, October 2019 
Appendix 1) 
Timeline of the WTO dispute between Airbus and Boeing 
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 2018 2019 Increase (Decrease) 
 A320ceo A320neo A321ceo A321neo A320ceo A320neo A321ceo A321neo A320ceo A320neo A321ceo A321neo 
Total 
Orders 480 253 439 335 480 220 439 388 0 
          
(33) 0 53 
Total 
Deliveries 477 31 377 9 480 47 407 25 3 16 30 16 
Aircraft in 
fleet 569 44 426 19 584 63 463 39 15 19 37 20 
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